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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for an Interlocutory Appeal. 
The Petition was granted on January 26, 1995 by the Supreme Court and poured into 
this Court. Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this Interlocutory Appeal: 
1. Did the trial court error when it ordered a new trial? 
After judgment was entered on the special verdict, the Court ordered a new 
trial on the stated basis that one of the questions in the special verdict was contrary 
to the law of the case. (R.1392). 
The question was: 
"Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that 
Gregory Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred 
at his residence on October 3, 1990?" (R.1122). 
The trial court's ruling was necessarily based upon its conclusion that the question 
set forth an incorrect burden of proof. 
1 
The first issue on appeal, an issue of first impression in Utah, is what was the 
proper burden of proof for Farm Bureau to prove its affirmative defense that Greg 
Horrell set fire to his own home. 
Standard of Review: Because the trial court's ruling 
ordering a new trial was based on its belief that it had 
given the jury an incorrect instruction on the burden of 
proof, the trial court's order granting a new trial should be 
reviewed for correctness. Olympus Hills Shopping v. 
Smith's Food & Drug. 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994); 
Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984): State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Issue Preserved in Trial court: These issues were raised 
in pretrial and post-trial proceedings. (R.1065, 1284, 
1342 A). 
2. Even if the burden of proof instruction to the jury was incorrect, 
this Court can determine that it was harmless error. 
Standard of Review: Even if the trial court gave an 
incorrect instruction on the burden of proof, the same jury 
2 
found by "a preponderance of the evidence" that the 
Horrells' claim did not rise to the level of being "fairly 
debatable." The jury also found that Farm Bureau did not 
conduct a diligent investigation. An appellate court will 
not reverse a judgment for mere error, unless the error 
involved is substantial and prejudicial. Kesler v. Rogers. 
542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975). An error is harmful only if 
the likelihood of a different outcome is high enough to 
undermine confidence in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
Issue Preserved in Trial court: This issue was raised in 
the trial court at R.1342T. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
The appellant is not aware of any statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations that 
are determinative of any issue in this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The Horrells commenced this action to recover 
the benefits of their insurance policy with Utah Farm Bureau and sought damages for 
Farm Bureau's "bad faith" conduct in mishandling and denying the claim. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. 
After a three week trial in June, 1994, a jury awarded the Horrells the benefits of 
their policy and damages for Farm Bureau's conduct. The jury also determined that 
the Horrells' claim was not "fairly debatable", and the trial court awarded the 
Horrells attorney's fees and costs, making a total judgment of $289,310.37. The 
defendants filed post-trial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a 
motion for a new trial. The trial court ordered that a new trial be had because, the 
trial court stated, it had mis-instructed the jury on the burden of proof for Farm 
Bureau to prove its affirmative defense that Gregory Horrell intentionally burned his 
residence. The Horrells filed a Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal, which Petition 
was granted and the matter poured into this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
C. Statement of Facts - Relevant to Issues Presented for Review. 
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1. On October 3, 1990, the residence of Gregory and Barbara 
Horrell caught fire. The Horrells' home was destroyed by the fire and the rekindling 
of the fire which occurred during that night. (R.2, 16, 1123). 
2. At the time the fire began, the Horrell's residence was insured by 
Utah Farm Bureau. (R.2, 16). 
3. Horrells began gathering information shortly after the fire, and 
by the end of January, 1991, believed they had given Farm Bureau the information 
it needed to process their claim. Between early February, 1991 and late September, 
1991, there was no communication between Utah Farm Bureau and the Horrells. 
The claims manager for Utah Farm Bureau who was responsible for handling the 
claim testified that he kept the Horrells' claim in a file cabinet and hoped that the 
Horrells would "go away" during this period of time. It was only after Horrells, 
through legal counsel, contacted Farm Bureau in late September, 1991, that Farm 
Bureau resumed its investigation. (Tr. 2323, 2024). 
4. In March, 1992, some 18 months after the fire, Utah Farm 
Bureau denied the Horrells' claim for insurance benefits under the policy. (Tr. 
Exhibit 46). 
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5. In June, 1992, the Horrells commenced this action against Farm 
Bureau seeking benefits under their homeowners' policy with Farm Bureau and 
among other things, seeking damages for Utah Farm Bureau's conduct in 
mishandling the claim. (R.2). 
6. The precise cause of the fire was never determined. At trial, 
plaintiff presented expert testimony that the fire could have been started by accidental 
causes and that the precise cause of the fire could not be determined, in part because 
of the incomplete investigation done immediately after the fire. (Tr. 2551). Farm 
Bureau presented experts who testified that the fire was caused by arson and opined 
that Greg Horrell intentionally set the fire. (Tr. 3151, 3192). 
7. At trial, the plaintiff presented expert testimony on Utah Farm 
Bureau's conduct in mishandling the claim. Plaintiffs' expert testified, without 
equivocation, that the Horrells' claim was not fairly debatable and that based upon 
his experience the claim should have been paid because there was insufficient 
information to raise it to the level of debatability. (Tr. 2570, 2622). Farm Bureau 
presented testimony that the claim was fairly debatable and that Farm Bureau was 
justified in denying the claim. (Tr. 3026). 
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8. The case was presented to a jury over a three week period 
commencing June 7, 1994. On June 24, 1994, the jury returned a special verdict 
(R. 1122), a copy of which is included in the Addendum to this brief. In the special 
verdict, the jury found as follows: 
1) Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that 
Gregory Horrell intentionally set the fire which 
occurred at his residence on October 3, 1990? 
Answer: No. 
2) Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that 
either Gregory or Barbara Horrell intentionally 
misrepresented to Farm Bureau material facts 
concerning their claim as defined in the jury 
instructions? 
Answer: No. 
3) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the second fire was rekindling of the first fire? 
Answer: Yes. 
4) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Farm Bureau failed to diligently investigate the facts 
surrounding Horrells' claim to determine whether 
the claim was valid? 
Answer: Yes. 
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5) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Farm Bureau breached any of its other contractual 
duties of good faith and fair dealing to Horrells, 
including the duties to: fairly evaluate the claims; 
act fairly and reasonably in either rejecting or 
settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as layman 
and not as experts in the subtleties of law and 
insurance; refrain from injuring the Horrells' ability 
to obtain the benefits of the insurance policy? 
Answer: Yes. 
6) Do you find bv a preponderance of the evidence that 
the Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that 
term has been defined in the instructions? 
Answer: No. 
(Emphasis added). 
9. The jury awarded Horrells $150,000.00 in damages. (R. 1124). 
10. A judgment based upon the special verdict was entered on August 
8, 1994. The judgment was for $289,310.37 and included reasonable attorneys fees, 
costs and interest awarded by the trial court as part of the judgment. (R. 1245). A 
copy of this judgment is included in the Addendum. 
11. On August 18, 1994, Utah Farm Bureau filed a Motion for a 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a Motion for a New Trial. (R.1284, 
1258). 
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12. On November 4, 1994, at the conclusion of oral argument on 
Farm Bureau's motions, the district court ordered that (R.1441): 
Defendant's motion for a new trial be and the 
same is hereby granted based on the Court's 
requiring Defendants at trial to prove their 
affirmative defenses of intentional burning 
and misrepresentation by clear and 
convincing evidence. The Court had, in its 
April 19, 1994 Order denying the parties' 
cross-motions for summary judgment, 
ordered that Defendants would be required to 
prove their affirmative defenses by a 
preponderance of the evidence and the law of 
the case that was established by that Order 
should have been followed at trial. The grant 
of a new trial under the foregoing basis 
makes the other grounds set forth in 
Defendant's motion for a new trial and the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict moot. 
The August 8, 1994 judgment was vacated and a new trial ordered. (R.1441). 
13. Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. The petition 
was granted by the Supreme Court on January 26, 1995. (R.1449). The issues in 
this Brief were limited by a prior order of this Court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The jury was properly instructed on Farm Bureau's burden 
of proving intentional burning. The jury was instructed that Farm Bureau had to 
prove its defense of intentional burning by clear and convincing evidence. The jury 
concluded that this burden of proof had not been met. The jury also determined, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that Farm Bureau failed to diligently investigate the 
facts surrounding Horrell's claim and that Horrell's claim was "fairly debatable." 
The burden of proof to be applied to an insurer where arson is alleged as an 
affirmative defense is an issue of first impression in Utah. In essence, the defense 
is one based upon fraudulent conduct by the insured. The general rule in Utah has 
been that proof of fraud must be by clear and convincing evidence. Arson carries 
with it even stronger stigmas than allegations of fraud. For the same reasons that 
public policy requires that fraud be proven by clear and convincing evidence, proof 
of arson should be made by the same standard. Public policy supports the higher 
standard of proof. 
The better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions support the clear and 
convincing standard in arson cases. A significant number of other jurisdictions have 
10 
addressed the burden of proof to be applied in civil arson cases. Many of the cases 
supporting the lower burden of proof, i.e., preponderance of the evidence, provide 
little or no analysis with respect to the burden of proof. Those cases that have 
weighed factors to be considered in establishing a burden of proof have determined 
that clear and convincing evidence is the better measure. 
If Farm Bureau's defense of arson is considered in light of contract law 
principles, the higher burden of proof would also be applicable. The Utah courts 
have long recognized that a party seeking to avoid contractual obligations must do 
so by clear and convincing evidence. Other Utah decisions have accepted the clear 
and convincing evidence standard in civil litigation wherein allegations of quasi 
criminal fraudulent conduct are alleged. These cases also support the application of 
a clear and convincing standard to the circumstances in this case. 
2. Even if the jury was improperly instructed, under the 
circumstances, it was harmless error. This Court may disregard any error or 
defect which occurred in instructing the jury which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. The jury in this case answered a number of questions, using 
different burdens of proof. In addition to the special interrogatory which required 
Farm Bureau to prove their allegations of arson by clear and convincing evidence, 
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the jury was asked to respond to a number of questions using the preponderance of 
the evidence standard. For example, the jury determined, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the Horrells' claim did not rise to the level of being "fairly debatable." 
The trial court instructed the jury on what fairly debatable meant in the context of 
this litigation. In light of all of the special interrogatories which were answered by 
the jury, it is clear that they would have reached the same result even if the trial 
court had instructed them to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether 
the Horrells intentionally set the fire. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF ON FARM BUREAU'S DEFENSE OF INTENTIONAL BURNING. 
After judgment was entered in plaintiffs favor (R.1245), Farm Bureau filed 
a motion for a new trial and a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
(R.1258, 1284). 
The general rule governing the granting of a new trial is that the trial court 
must find at least one of the seven grounds listed in Rule 59 to have been met. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). While the trial 
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court did not specifically identify any of these seven grounds, Judge Rigtrup stated 
in his oral ruling that he was granting a new trial because the Court had not followed 
"the law of the case" regarding the burden of proof to be applied to Farm Bureau's 
affirmative defenses. (R.1392).1 There is no controlling Utah case which has 
determined what burden of proof should have been applied to Farm Bureau's 
affirmative defense. In effect, the new trial was ordered based upon the trial court's 
belief that an error of law might have occurred on an issue where the law is unsettled 
in Utah. 
In its Answer (R.15), Utah Farm Bureau asserted as an affirmative defense 
that the Horrells 
"Intentionally made misrepresentations of material fact 
relating to [their] loss, in violation of the following general 
condition in the policy: 
Concealment of Fraud. The entire policy will be void if, 
whether before or after a loss, an insured has: 
1
 "Law of the case" does not preclude a trial judge from changing an earlier ruling up to 
the time a final decision is formally rendered. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 
at 1311 (Utah App. 1994). Law of the case did not preclude the trial judge from giving the jury 
instruction at issue. 
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a. Intentionally concealed or mis-
represented any material fact or 
circumstance; 
b. Engaged in any fraudulent conduct; or 
c. Made false statements." (Ninth 
Defense). 
On the last full day of evidence, the trial court permitted the defendants to 
amend their Answer to add as an affirmative defense that the Horrells had 
intentionally burned their residence. (Tr. 3256, 3269, 3271). 
At the conclusion of the three week jury trial, the jury was asked to consider 
and return a special verdict. (R. 1122). The questions on the special verdict included 
the following: 
1. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that 
Gregory Horrell intentionally set the fire which 
occurred at his residence on October 3, 1990? 
Answer: Yes No x 
4. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Farm Bureau failed to diligently investigate the facts 
surrounding Horrells' claim to determine whether 
the claim was valid? 
Answer: Yes x No 
14 
6. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that 
term has been defined in the instructions? 
Answer: Yes No x (R.1122). (Emphasis added) 
In their motion for a new trial, Farm Bureau argued that the special verdict 
should have requested the jury to determine the first question by a "preponderance 
of the evidence." The trial court, having determined during the course of preparing 
jury instructions with counsel to instruct the jury to make the determination by "clear 
and convincing evidence," apparently changed its mind and ordered a new trial. 
This appeal followed. 
On review, orders granting or denying motions for a new trial will not 
ordinarily be reversed by the Appellate Court unless there has been an abuse of 
discretion. Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
While it is questionable, at the trial level at least, how an error of law could have 
occurred when there is no controlling authority on the issue, that circumstance is 
now problematic. The parties are before this Court seeking a determination of the 
appropriate burden of proof. 
Which burden of proof should be applied to Farm Bureau's defense that it was 
excused from performance because of intentional burning in this case is an issue of 
15 
law and one of first impression in Utah. The standard of review for issues of law 
is for correctness. Olympus Hills Shopping v. Smiths Food & Drug. 889 P.2d 445 
(Utah 1994). 
A. Public policy supports a "clear and convincing" standard. T h e 
Horrells agree that public policy should not protect those who would commit arson. 
It does not follow, however, that an insurer should be permitted to assert and prove 
a defense based on arson by a mere "preponderance" of the evidence. 
Public policy does not encourage fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation. And 
yet, persons who claim to be the victims of fraud in Utah have always been required 
to prove the fraud by "clear and convincing evidence." Pace v. Parish. 247 P.2d 
273 (Utah 1952). The burden of proof for fraud has not been reduced simply 
because fraud should be discouraged. 
One reason that fraud must be proven by a higher standard is because of the 
stigma that follows it. A claim of arson carries with it an even stronger stigma. 
A claim or defense based on arson is, at a minimum, the legal equivalent of 
a claim based on fraud. In this case, Farm Bureau's defense is, in simple common 
terms, that Greg Horrell attempted to defraud it by secretly setting his home on fire 
and asking to recover on his policy. To be accused of arson carries with it all the 
16 
stigmas that attach to fraud. See Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Bloomfield. 637 
P.2d 176 at 180 fn. 4, (Ore. 1981). It is these stigmas that give rise to the 
requirement for a higher burden of proof in fraud cases. Jackson v. Rutledge. 231 
So.2d 803 (Miss. 1970). 
An allegation of civil arson, the burning of one's own home involves a 
devastating accusation of moral turpitude. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire 
Insur.. 161 Md. 249, 156 A. 847 (Md. 1931). The consequences of the allegations 
are immediate and enormous. Public policy should require that allegations of 
criminal/fraudulent conduct be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the same 
burden of proof used in fraud cases. 
A second public policy reason exists for the application of a higher burden of 
proof in arson cases. The policy in this case was an "all-risk" policy whereby Farm 
Bureau agreed to insure against damages caused by any fire, regardless of the cause 
of the fire (except in the case of fires intentionally started by the insured). (Policy, 
R.1201, para. l.h.). Milton Beck testimony, Tr. 2530. Even though the cause of 
the fire at the Horrell residence was never established (except by conjecture and 
opinion), Farm Bureau seeks through the application of a mere preponderance of the 
evidence standard — essentially a 50/50 evidentiary standard - to put the Horrells 
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in a position of having to prove they did not cause the fire. If this lower burden of 
proof is adopted for "all risk" fire insurance policies, especially where the cause of 
the fire is unknown, insureds would unwittingly be shouldered with the burden to 
prove they did not start the fire. Such a standard would require insureds to 
undertake enormous expenditures of time and money immediately after a fire at a 
time when they usually have neither. (Tr. 2558). To protect their rights, insureds 
would have to employ their own investigators and experts at enormous costs. These 
expenditures are the very things insureds seek to avoid when they purchase "all risk" 
insurance. (Tr. 2530). 
Insurance companies have comparatively great resources to investigate and 
determine the cause and origin of a fire. On the other hand, a fire of the type that 
occurred here normally devastates the financial resources of the insured. As a result, 
the insured has little, if any resources to investigate the cause and origin of the fire. 
More importantly, the insured has no reason to undertake an investigation of the 
cause and origin of the fire. The purpose of insurance contracts is to provide 
insureds with peace of mind and protection. Insurance companies, because of their 
resources, are in a unique position to be able to establish arson by clear and 
convincing evidence, the same burden of proof applied in other civil cases where 
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moral turpitude is at issue. There is no reason why insurance companies should 
obtain special consideration through a lower burden of proof. " [Fjraud is fraud and 
where it's raised as a defense in a fire insurance case should not lower the standard 
of proof." Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America. 780 P.2d 116 at 134 (Idaho 
1989) (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
B. The better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions support the clear 
and convincing standard in arson cases. A significant number of other 
jurisdictions have addressed the burden of proof to be applied in civil arson cases. 
A majority of those cases have applied the lower "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard. If Utah were to determine its law simply by counting the number of cases 
on each side of the issue from other jurisdictions, there would be little reason for 
Utah to have appellate courts. There are good reasons for Utah to reject the 
majority view. 
Not all of the cases on either side of the issue can be distinguished. Many of 
the cases which have adopted the lower burden of proof are cataloged in a decision, 
Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Co.. 540 A.2d 693 (Conn. 1988). Many of the 
cases purporting to support the lower burden of proof are either poorly reasoned or 
not reasoned at all. In many of the cases the burden of proof was not genuinely in 
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dispute. For example, in some of the cases the insurer had lost at trial on the lower 
preponderance standard, and neither party was contending on appeal that any higher 
burden of proof should have been required. See Texas General Indemnity Co. v. 
Speakman. 736 S.W.2d 874 (Texas Civil App. 1987); Zajac v. Great American 
Insurance Companies. 410 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1987); Trempe v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co.. 480 N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 1985). In other cases, the burden of proof did 
not appear to have been at issue and there was no discussion within the case of the 
factors considered in applying the burden of proof. Precision Printers. Inc. v. 
Central Mutual Insurance Co.. 334 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 1985); Caserta v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.. 470 N.E.2d 430 (Ohio App. 1983); Seals. Inc. v. Tioga County 
Grange Mutual Insurance. 519 A.2d 951 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1986). 
Almost none of the cases cited in Verrastro. supra, contain any discussion of 
the public policy or the rationale for applying the burden of proof. Some of the 
cases cited in Verrastro in support of the preponderance rule actually stand for the 
application of a higher level of proof. For example, in Hayseeds. Inc. v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty. 352 S.E.2d 73 (W.Va. App. 1986) the court approved a jury 
instruction that stated in part as follows: 
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Such proof need only be by a preponderance of the 
evidence. However, such proof of voluntary and 
intentional burning should be clear and satisfactory, taking 
into consideration the presumption of innocence in such 
cases, which the evidence must be sufficient to overcome, 
and must do more than establish a basis for mere 
suspicion, speculation or conjecture. Where circumstantial 
evidence is relied on by State Farm, such evidence must 
be such as does more than throw a mere suspicion of guilt 
on the plaintiff, on the plaintiff, and the inference or 
presumption to which the facts give rise must be strong 
and almost inevitable. (Emphasis added). 
In Clifton v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.. 510 So.2d 759 
(La. App. 1987), another case listed in Verrastro as supporting the preponderance 
standard, the Louisiana Court of Appeals observed that the burden of proof could be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence "where the evidence is of such impact 
that it will sustain no other reasonable hypothesis but that the claimant is responsible 
for the fire." at 760. It is clear from this language, that the West Virginia and the 
Louisiana courts were requiring more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. 
Some of the cases which recognize a preponderance of the evidence standard 
result from the fact that the state does not recognize a higher burden of proof, i.e., 
clear and convincing, for civil fraud. Dairy Queen of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Travelers 
Indemnity Co. of America. 748 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1988). 
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The Horrells submit that the better reasoned cases support the higher burden 
of proof, clear and convincing evidence. 
In Hutt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company. 466 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 
(1983), the court noted that "[t]he more contemporary measure of persuasion is that 
of clear and convincing evidence." In Hutt. the trial court required the insurer to 
prove its defense of arson only by a preponderance of the evidence, and the appeals 
court reversed and ordered a new trial. Hutt states that: 
To fasten upon a man the act of wilfully and maliciously 
setting fire to his own building should certainly require 
more evidence than to establish the fact of payment of a 
note, or the truth of an account in set off; because the 
improbability or presumption to be overcome in the one 
case is much stronger than it is in the other. Hence, it can 
never be improper to call the attention of the jury to the 
character of the issue, and to remind them that more 
evidence should be required to establish grave charges than 
to establish trifling or indifferent ones, (quoting 2 Jones, 
Commentaries on Evidence [2d ed.], § 563, p. 1036). 
Id, 
The Hutt court found the "clear and convincing standard . . . more in accord 
with New York law which has long imposed a 'far more demanding' burden when 
a serious accusation involving moral turpitude, such as fraud, is leveled." IcL at 30, 
fn. 2. As discussed subsequently (p. 29, 31), Utah cases have imposed a higher 
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burden of proof when accusations of moral turpitude are leveled in civil cases. The 
Hutt case is consistent with other Utah decisions in that it observes that fraud in civil 
cases must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
In Carpenter v. Union Insurance Society of Canton. Ltd.. 284 F.2d 155 (4th 
Cir. 1960), (a case arising in South Carolina) in ruling that the "clear and 
convincing" standard was the correct burden of proof, the court observed: 
"Now if this was an incendiary fire for the purpose of 
collecting insurance it was a fraudulent fire. Fraud is 
never presumed and must be proven by evidence clear and 
convincing." [Citations omitted.] This is fully in accord 
with the general principal that the burden of proof of an 
act of a criminal nature asserted as a defense in a civil 
action is somewhere in between the standard requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case and 
the preponderance of evidence requirement in the ordinary 
civil case. The proper test is that such defense be 
established by clear and convincing proof; that it be shown 
by "clear and satisfactory evidence to a reasonable 
certainty." Ziegler v. Hustisford Farmers Mut. Ins. Co.. 
1941, 238 Wis. 298 N.W. 610; 7 Wigmore, Evidence 
§2498(3) (3d.ed. 1940). 
Id, at 162. 
In McGorv v. Allstate Insurance Co.. 527 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1988), the Court 
reasoned as follows: 
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To begin with, the burden rests upon an insurer claiming 
civil arson to prove it, and this is so whether it be asserted 
defensively in an action by the insured on a policy or, as 
here, in an action by the insurer for declaratory judgment. 
But what of the quantum of proof an insurer must offer to 
establish the policy avoidance defense of civil arson? 
Many cases and other jurisdictions have held that the 
insurers' burden is the conventional "by a preponderance 
of the evidence" burden, (citations omitted). 
Civil arson seems very much like fraud. And as all know, 
Mississippi law requires that a party charging fraud prove 
his charge by clear and convincing evidence, (citations 
omitted). 
. . . civil arson against an insurer, like embezzlement, is 
an act of fraud. 
The nature of the charge Allstate is leveling against the 
McGorys is that they have engaged in an attempt to 
defraud Allstate. Though this is not precisely the type of 
fraud contemplated by Johnson v. Brewer and the other 
cases cited above, we know of no principled basis upon 
which it might be distinguished. Quantum of proof 
standards reflect the degree of confidence we demand for 
particular findings. They measure our willingness to risk 
error, (citations omitted). The nature and consequences 
of the charge of fraud are such that we demand proof by 
clear and convincing evidence, and for good and apparent 
reason. No reason has been suggested why fraud by arson 
might be established by a lesser quantum of evidence, and 
no reason appears. 
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More precisely, assuming that our law for good reason 
requires that fraud generally be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, no reason has been suggested why 
fraud by arson might be proved by a lesser quantum of 
evidence, certainly no reason appears to us upon 
reflection. When we add Stewart's holding that the charge 
of fraud by embezzlement must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, the point is made. Accepting the 
lesser preponderance standard would only import an 
arbitrary distinction into our law, one devoid of principled 
justification. 
We hold that when an insurer seeks to avoid coverage 
under a fire insurance policy charging that the insured has 
been guilty of civil arson, the insurer must prove each 
element of its claim by clear and convincing evidence. 
In Mize v. Hartford Insurance Co.. 567 Fed.Supp. 550, 552 (W.D. Va. 
1982), a case applying Virginia law, the Federal District Court looked to an earlier 
Virginia decision, Virginia Fire Marine Insurance v. Hogue, 54 S.E. 8 (1906) as 
setting forth the burden of proof in civil arson cases in Virginia. Virginia Fire stated 
that the defense if civil arson had to be proven by "clear and convincing" proof. 
The insurer in Mize attempted to distinguish Virginia Fire on the basis that burden 
of proof should apply only to fraudulent misstatements and not to the arson defense. 
The Court stated in response: 
In my opinion, the rationale of Virginia Fire does not 
admit of such a distinction. The whole thrust of the 
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Virginia Fire rationale is that where the defense is one of 
a criminal act by the insured, the presumption that most 
people are law-abiding citizens requires that such assertion 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Arson is one 
of the defenses which would come within that 
classification, (at 552). 
See also Ziegler v. Hustisford Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.. 298 N.W. 610 
(Wise. 1941) (rule is well established that in civil actions where crime, fraud, 
criminal conduct or conspiracy is alleged, proof must be by "clear and satisfactory 
evidence," adopting rationale from Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2nd Ed)); 
Jonas v. Northeastern Mutual Fire Insurance Co.. 171 N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1969) 
(evidence necessary in civil case to prove act that constitutes a crime is "middle 
standard of proof - clear, satisfactory and convincing"). 
At least one court has addressed the philosophical dilemma that would result 
if a higher burden of proof is applied to fraud than to arson. In Transamerica 
Insurance Co. v. Bloomfield. 637 P.2d 176 at 180 (Ore. App. 1981), the Court 
stated in a footnote that: 
Although not an issue in this appeal, it is philosophically 
perplexing, in light of the "stigma" rationale for the higher 
standard [for fraud], that plaintiffs might have proved by 
a mere preponderance of the evidence that the defendants 
committed arson, but were required to adduce clear and 
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convincing evidence to establish their allegations that the 
defendants were not being candid in denying that they 
admitted arson. 
In a scathing dissent to an Idaho opinion adopting the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, Justice Bistline in Pacheco v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 
780 P.2d 116, 123 (Idaho 1989) sets forth a carefully reasoned explanation as to why 
the "clear and convincing" standard is more appropriate in civil arson cases. Justice 
Bistline observes that a clear and convincing standard often relates to the quality 
rather than to the quantum of proof, and that courts have long imposed a far more 
demanding burden when serious accusations involving moral turpitude are involved. 
(780 P.2d at 130). Justice Bistline points out errors in reasoning in some of the 
cases supporting the preponderance of the evidence standard. (780 P.2d 130, 131). 
Bistline attacks and debunks the notion that there can be a legitimate distinction 
drawn between allegations of fraud and allegations of arson. Bistline states in 
conclusion: 
This Court may make use of the record and do so in 
connection with resolving the issue as to whether arson is 
a species of fraud. Of course it is, and it is fraudulent 
conduct, as the New York court noted in Hutt, to buy 
insurance coverage and light a fire to the buildings insured 
with collection of the policy proceeds in mind. By way of 
distinction, to set fire to an enemy's house as a means of 
27 
revenge is not fraudulent, although it is criminal, and also 
could result in a damage action sounding in tort. 
There is no distinction, however, in alleging arson for 
profit or alleging fraudulent conduct, as Safeco initially 
did. We can best gauge what Safeco had in mind by its 
first pleading where it alleged both. There isn't a hair's 
breadth difference between the two. 780 P.2d at 130, 
131. 
Clear and convincing evidence is essential when a claim of criminal or 
fraudulent wrongdoing is made in order to prevent the erroneous tarnishing of the 
reputation of the other party. For that and other reasons, courts have required clear 
and convincing proof of the defenses of intentional burning (or arson) and material 
misrepresentation. The reason is clear. There is no real distinction between a 
defense of arson and a defense of fraud. 
C. Farm Bureau's contentions are ones of contract avoidance, to which 
a higher standard of proof should also be applied. Farm Bureau will argue that 
their defense of arson is a simple contract defense, subject only to proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. As discussed previously, this policy was an "all 
risk" policy. Farm Bureau will contend that their contractual obligation to pay for 
"all" fires was avoided by Greg Horrell's conduct. This argument, however, ignores 
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Utah decisions that have long recognized that claims of contract avoidance are 
subject to a higher burden of proof. 
For example, efforts to avoid contractual obligations based upon mistake of 
fact must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Mabey v. Kay Peterson. 682 
P.2d 287 (Utah 1984); Thompson v. Smith. 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980); Neelev v. 
Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979); Kirchgestner & Denver Rio Grande W. R. R. 
Co.. 233 P.2d 699 (Utah 1950). 
Claims by a party to a contract that he was induced to enter it by 
misrepresentation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Jensen v. 
Eddy. 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1973). Clear and convincing evidence is required to 
show that a writing is not the agreement of the parties. Tippets v. Oppenshaw. 425 
P.2d 160 (Utah 1967); Rigglev. DainesMfg.. 463 P.2d 1 (Utah 1969); Otteson v. 
Malone. 584 P.2d 878 (Utah 1978). 
Facts supporting a right to reformation of a contract must be shown by clear 
and convincing evidence. Peterson v. Eldridge. 246 P.2d 886 (Utah 1952); Ingram 
v. Forrer. 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977). 
The claims made by Farm Bureau in this case go far beyond a simple breach 
of contract. The claim is not that Greg Horrell failed to deliver products purchased 
29 
by Farm Bureau or that he failed to make payments on a note. Farm Bureau's claim 
is that it can avoid its contractual obligation to pay the Horrells their covered losses 
because Greg Horrell attempted to defraud them by burning his own home. 
To fasten upon a man the act of willfully and maliciously 
setting fire to his own building should certainly require 
more evidence than to establish the fact of payment of a 
note, or the truth of an account in set off; because the 
improbability or presumption to be overcome in the one 
case is much stronger than it is in the other. Hence, it can 
never be improper to call the attention of the jury to the 
character of the issue, and to remind them that more 
evidence should be required to establish grave changes 
than to establish trifling or indifferent ones. 2 Jones 
Commentaries on Evid. (2d. ed.), §563, p. 1036. 
D. Other Utah cases support a "clear and convincing" burden of proof. 
There are other Utah decisions which have recognized the rule that a civil litigant 
alleging that the other party has engaged in quasi-criminal fraudulent conduct must 
prove that conduct by clear and convincing evidence. 
In Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 
1989), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had engaged in a constructively 
fraudulent conveyance. This Court observed that the plaintiff had the burden to 
prove each element of the claim by clear and convincing evidence (at 458). See also 
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Jensen v. Eames. 519 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1974) ("the burden is upon the one 
alleging the fraudulent conveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the transfer was in fact fraudulent"). 
The Utah Supreme Court also has required a higher standard of proof in other 
civil cases where one party accused the other with immoral, criminal or fraudulent 
conduct. In Matter of Adoption of Hallo way, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), the 
adopting couple was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
child's mother intended to abandon her child. And, clear and convincing evidence 
was required in In re McCullough. 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939), before an 
attorney could be stripped of his livelihood through disbarment. 
In a Colorado case, Boulder Valley School District v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 
(Colo. 1991), a teacher brought a federal civil rights claim against the school district. 
The Colorado Supreme Court discussed in terms applicable to this case why a higher 
standard of proof was appropriate in that civil rights case, stating 
A standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the 
evidence is justified in civil cases involving allegations of 
fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the 
defendant. "The interests at stake in those cases are 
deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money 
and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the 
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by 
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increasing the plaintiffs burden of proof." [Citation 
omitted.] 
Id, at 1090. 
In this case, where the insurance company defends on the basis that the 
insured acted intentionally, fraudulently, committing a criminal act, the higher 
burden of proof should be applied. Utah courts have long applied a higher burden 
of proof in nearly all types of cases, including contract cases, where contract 
avoidance or fraudulent and quasi criminal conduct is alleged. This case should be 
no exception. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED, UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs this Court to disregard any 
error or defect which occurred during the trial of this case "which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this Rule 
to justify reversal, or in this case a new trial, only if Farm Bureau can show error 
that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense there is at least a reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of the error the result would have been different." 
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Ortega v. Thomas. 383 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1963); See also Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) ("an error is harmful only if 
the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our 
confidence in the verdict."). Horrells argued in the trial court that any potential 
error was harmless because of the jury's response to other questions in the Special 
Verdict. (F.1342T). The trial court ruled that this argument was moot. (R.1392). 
Because Farm Bureau cannot show that the Court's application of the clear and 
convincing standard of proof was 1) wrong or 2) prejudicial, the trial court should 
not have granted Farm Bureau a new trial. 
Courts have frequently looked to juries' special verdicts to determine whether 
or not a particular error warrants reversal. See e.g. Howell v. Parker (In re 
Richard's Estate). 297 P.2d 542 (Utah 1956) cert. den. 352 U.S. 943; U.S. 
Industries. Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co.. 854 F.2d 1223, 1253 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Spellacy v. Southern Pacific Co.. 428 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1970). In the instant 
case, the jury's special verdict eliminates any possibility that the trial court's 
application of the clear and convincing standard of proof to Farm Bureau's 
affirmative defense was prejudicial. 
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Paragraph 6 of the special verdict reads: 
6. Do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as 
that term has been defined in the instructions? (emphasis 
added) 
To this question, the jury answered "no." (R.1123). This answer clearly indicates 
that the jury would have found that Plaintiff did not intentionally burn his home even 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
The trial court instructed the jury that: 
If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the 
claim, its refusal to negotiate or settle may not constitute 
a breach of its duty. 
An insurer may be reasonably justified in denying a claim 
if the supporting law or facts are "fairly debatable" and 
would lead a reasonable insurance company in similar 
circumstances to deny the claim. 
"Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which 
support the insurer's position create a reasonable 
likelihood that the denial of the claim would be upheld in 
court. In determining whether or not the insurer's position 
was fairly debatable and reasonably justified, you should 
consider all laws or facts upon which a reasonable 
insurance company would rely in deciding whether to pay 
a claim. 
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Jury Instruction No. 25. (R.1097). The jury was instructed in the Special Verdict 
that it was to decide the "fairly debatable" question by a lower "preponderance" 
standard. 
In this Special Verdict interrogatory, the jury was asked to consider whether 
Farm Bureau had "reasonable justification" to deny the claim and whether there was 
a "reasonable likelihood" to deny the claim and whether there was a "reasonable 
likelihood" that Farm Bureau would prevail in Court. The jury's response was that 
there was no reasonable justification for Farm Bureau to deny the claim. 
If the jury had determined that Plaintiff intentionally burned his home, 
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard set forth in paragraph 6 of the 
special verdict, this finding would have rendered Plaintiffs claim "fairly debatable." 
In other words, if the jury was convinced, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
Plaintiff intentionally burned his home, the jury would necessarily have answered 
"yes" to Question 6 in the Special Verdict. Its negative answer to that Question 6 
clearly shows that the jury was not convinced, even by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Plaintiff intentionally burned his home. Because the jury reached the 
same conclusion, based on the lower burden of proof, the error that Farm Bureau 
complained of was harmless because there was no likelihood that a different outcome 
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would have occurred. Crookston. supra. Therefore, the trial court's application of 
the clear and convincing standard to that issue did not prejudice Farm Bureau. 
On the issue of harmless error, the case of Walker v. Eason. 643 S.W.2d 390 
(Tex. 1982) is comparable to this case. At issue in Walker was whether by placing 
the burden of proving mental incapacity upon the wrong party the trial court 
committed reversible error. In answering this question, the Court looked to the 
jury's response to a special interrogatory to which the jury did not merely answer 
"yes" or "no" but rather, affirmatively found that "she did not have sufficient mental 
capacity." Id. at 391. The Court held that the trial court's error in establishing the 
burden of proof was harmless error because "the jury made a definitive finding that 
Pearl Eason 'did not have sufficient mental capacity.'" LcL Thus, the Court 
concluded, the outcome of the trial would have been the same regardless of who had 
the burden of proof. 
Similarly, the jury in this case has clearly shown in its Special Verdict that the 
outcome of this trial would have been the same regardless of the standard of proof 
imposed. The trial court's application of the clear and convincing standard of proof 
did not prejudice Farm Bureau and the trial court should have denied Farm Bureau's 
Motion for New Trial on this issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order granting a new trial should be set aside, 
the judgment entered by the District Court on August 8, 1994 based upon the special 
verdict should be affirmed, and the matter should be remanded to the District Court 
solely for the purpose of determining and awarding additional attorney's fees and 
costs. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The plaintiff requests the opportunity to present oral argument on these issues. 
DATED this (7 day of July, 1995. 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
(Special Verdict) 
rlLEDb..fRIClCUUHl 
Third-indicia'District 
JUN 2 ^ 1994 
iTY, 
By. Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
GREGORY S. HORRELL and 
BARBARA HORRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 
INSURANCE CO,, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 920903327 
After consideration of the Court's instructions, you the 
jurors are requested to answer the following questions. Six or 
more of you must agree on the answer to each question. 
1. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory 
Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence 
on October 3, 1990? 
ANSWER: Yes No /C 
2. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that either 
Gregory or Barbara Horrell intentionally misrepresented to Farm 
Bureau material facts concerning their claim as defined in the jury 
instructions? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
-2-
If you have answered questions 1 or 2 "yes," then you 
should sign and return this Special Verdict, 
3. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
second fire was a rekindling of the first fire? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm 
Bureau failed to diligently investigate the facts surrounding 
Horrells' claim to determine whether the claim was valid? 
ANSWER: Yes >C No 
5. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm 
Bureau breached any of its other contractual duties of good faith 
and fair dealing owed to Horrells, including the duties to: fairly 
evaluate the claim; act promptly and reasonably in either rejecting 
or settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as laymen and not as 
experts in the subtleties of law and insurance; refrain from 
injuring the Horrells' ability to obtain the benefits of the 
insurance policy? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
6. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that term has been 
defined in the instructions? 
ANSWER: Yes No \ 
-3-
7. If your response to Question 3 is "no,11 you may award 
only damages resulting from the first fire. If your response to 
question 3 is "yes," then you may award the Horrells damages 
suffered as a result of both fires. Based upon this possible 
limitation, what by a preponderance of the evidence are the damages 
suffered by the Horrells as a result of the fires and/or as a 
result of Farm Bureau's conduct for: 
Damage to the Horrells7 residence n/ ~-
 An 
(not to exceed $46,500.00) $ ibfj(J(J'UU 
Damage to the Horrells7 personal property ,~ 
(not to exceed $77,000.00) $ bfjj 000, 00 
Damage for Horrells7 loss of use of the ^ ~ 
property (not to exceed $5,950.00) $b,/Dp.OP 
Demolition $Affl) -CO 
Other general and consequential damages, 
as described in the jury instructions, -
 n 
but not including attorney7s fees $ji:b00f V0 
TOTAL j *)50MO'OD 
Dated this ^1 day of June, l*P*r 
A t \ A A Ci « 
ADDENDUM B 
(Judgment) 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY S. HORRELL and BARBARA 
HORRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, and 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
CO., 
Defendants. 
%\^H03°\ 
^-u-qs-^i^a^. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920903327CV 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third 
District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah for a jury trial beginning on June 7, 1994. The matter was 
tried on June 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23 and 24, 1994. On June 24, 1994, the jury 
returned a special verdict as follows: 
After consideration of the Court's instructions, you the jurors are requested to 
answer the following questions. Six or more of you must agree on the answer to each 
question. 
Th.rd Judicial District 
m 0 8 1934 
Deputy Clerk 
1. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory Horrell 
intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence on October 3, 1990? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
2. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that either Gregory or 
Barbara Horrell intentionally misrepresented to Farm Bureau material facts concerning 
their claim as defined in the jury instructions: 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If you have answered questions 1 or 2 "yes," the you should sign and return this 
Special Verdict. 
3. Do you fmd by a preponderance of the evidence that the second fire was 
a rekindling of the first fire? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Do you fmd by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm Bureau failed 
to diligently investigate the facts surrounding Horrells' claim to determine whether the 
claim was valid? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
5. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm Bureau 
breached any of its other contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing owed to 
Horrells, including the duties to: fairly evaluate the claim; act promptly and reasonably 
in either rejecting or settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as laymen and not as 
experts in the subtleties of law and insurance; refrain from injuring the Horrells' ability 
to obtain the benefits of the insurance policy? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
6. Do you fmd by a preponderance of the evidence that the Horrells' claim 
was "fairly debatable" as that term has been defined in the instructions? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
7. If you response to Question 3 is "no," you may award only damages 
resulting from the first fire. If your response to question 3 is "yes," then you may award 
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the Horrells damages suffered as a result of both fires. Based upon this possible 
limitation, what by a preponderance of the evidence are the damages suffered by the 
Horrells as a result of the fires and/or as a result of Farm Bureau's conduct for: 
Damage to the Horrells' residence 
(not to exceed $46,500.00) $ 46,500.00 
Damage to the Horrells' personal property 
(not to exceed $77,000.00) $ 60,000.00 
Damage for Horrells' loss of use of the 
property (not to exceed $5,950.00) $ 5,950.00 
Demolition $ 2,950.00 
Other general and consequential damages, 
as described in the jury instructions, 
but not including attorney's fees $ 34,600.00 
TOTAL $150,000.00 
Dated this 24 day of June, 1994. 
Signed 
FOREPERSON 
Based upon the special verdict, the pleadings on file herein, the stipulations of the 
parties, and all of the proceedings before the court, it is hereby: 
ORDERED that judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of the plaintiffs 
Gregory S. Horrell and Barbara Horrell and against Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company and 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, jointly and severally, as follows: 
$150,000.00, as set forth in the special verdict; 
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$ 43,329.37, as prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum calculated as follows: 
at 10% per annum from October 4, 1990 until August 4, 1994 on the Horrells' 
property damage ($106,500 x 1399 days x 10% per year = $40,820.13); plus 
10% per annum on Horrells' additional living expenses as incurred (calculated at 
10% from the date of each payment reflected in the receipts in Trial Exhibit 121) 
($1,841.66); plus 10% per annum on demolition costs (from April 30, 1992 to 
August 4, 1994 ($2,950.00 x 826 days x 10% per year = $667.58). 
$ 89,179.00, as reasonable attorneys' fees up to July 5, 1994, plus 
$ 1,518.00, as reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiffs after July 5, 1994 up to 
the date of plaintiffs counsel's affidavit dated July 28, 1994. 
$ 5,284.00, (a stipulated sum) as costs. The total of these figures is: 
$289,310.37, the TOTAL JUDGMENT, plus post-judgment interest at the legal rate of 
5.61% per annum from August 4, 1994 until paid. 
DATED this 8 ^davof August, 1994. 
Approved as to fo 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this S day of August, 1994, to the following: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Cynthia Meyer 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
da\horrell.jdg 
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HORRELL v. FARM BUREAU 
Civil No. 920903327CV 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
INTEREST ON RENTAL PAYMENT AT 103 
Payment Date 
Oct. 28, 1990 
Nov. 26, 1990 
Dec. 28, 1990 
Jan. 30, 1991 
March 3, 1991 
March 30, 1991 
April 30, 1991 
June 1, 1991 
July 1, 1991 
Aug. 3, 1991 
Aug. 31, 1991 
Sept. 27, 1991 
Oct. 30, 1991 
Dec. 2, 1991 
Dec. 30, 1991 
Jan. 29, 1992 
Feb. 29, 1992 
Amount 
$350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
Interest 
Days 
1374 
1346 
1314 
1281 
1249 
1224 
1191 
1160 
1129 
1096 
1068 
1041 
1008 
975 
947 
917 
887 
Amount 
$ 131.75 
129.07 
126.00 
122.84 
119.77 
117.37 
114.21 
111.23 
108.26 
105.10 
102.41 
99.73 
96.65 
93.49 
90.80 
87.93 
85.05 
TOTAL $1841.66 
ADDENDUM C 
(Transcript of Court's Ruling Granting New Trial) 
iMfcajS- s- tlMaJsM *> Z5tOS4 vu Thiro vddicial District 
liffjottzn ncT i« m 
THE COURT: The Court is persuade»P«*Wt 
there is substantial evidence that the claims were 
fairly debatable, I make no finding thereon, but 
simply make the observation. 
I am convinced and persuaded that the 
Court ought not to surrender to overzealous 
advocacy. And it is a more orderly way to proceed in 
following the law of the case that that was 
established by the Court's order April the 19th, 
1994, in which I had concluded in written form that 
the issues on the defenses would be submitted to the 
jury on a preponderance of the evidence. Wherein in 
the heat of battle that was or didn't come to my 
attention or didn't at least get from counsel to the 
Court's mind clearly is beyond me. But as bad as I 
hate to do it, the Court's going to grant a new 
trial. I think that makes the other rulings moot. 
MR. MEADE: Your Honor, we did discuss 
that at the time, and -- I mean, there is no — there 
is no case law that supports this one way or the 
other in this state. And I realize that you've 
spoken, but the fact of the matter is that a new 
trial in this case is going to take a lot of time and 
cost a lot of money. And we could try this case on 
this different standard and we could go up and you 
001o s 9> 
could be wrong and we will be back. The worst case 
after an appeal is that we try the case twice. Now, 
you are subjecting the parties to the chance that 
they may have to try this case three times. And, I 
submit that the -.- that there's no logic involved in 
that given the fact that there's no controlling case 
law. You are just taking a shot at it as to what the 
burden might be. And we ought to find out from some 
appellate court what the burden is going to be. And 
why spend another $50,000 to get there? 
THE COURT: I agree with the practical 
effects. 
New trial is granted. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
o o 1 3 9 ;> 
ADDENDUM D 
(Order Granting New Trial) 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 23J 5 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Fax number: (801) 531-9732 
Attorneys for Defendants 
HUD DISTRICT COURT 
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NOV 1994 
ik%^ 
Deputy Clerk 
II- THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH 
GREGORY S. HORRELL and 
BARBARA HORRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INJJLI* 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation., 
and FARM BUREAU MUT! 'AL 
INSURANCE CO., 
Defend ,ii lis. 
ORDER GRANTING 
NEW TRIAL, 
VACATING JUDGMENT AND 
RELEASING SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Civil No Q-20903327CV 
Jud-. h Kigirup 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment rv....viiiiMUiU...,. ... ..-.;. 
came on for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on Om-N*' p 1994 Plaintiffs 
were represented •• V- ,*1- TV Meade of Cohne. Rappaport «\ -v^ai. DwLei.dants were 
iq-.i •••- •' . .au &. Hansen. Having read 
and considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, and having heard and considered the 
arguments of counsel, and good cause ulheiwise appeaii.!;1,, ' 'i •"'., ORDERED !),,,! 
Defendants' Motion for New Trial be and the same is hereby granted based on the Court's 
0 014 4 
requirir • Pendants .ml tri.il lo prove their affirmative defenses of intentional burning and 
misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence. The Court; had, in. its April 19. 1994, 
be required to prove their affimiative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence and the law 
of the case that was established by lIiaL Oidei should IILIVC been lollmvcil M tii.il Hie ^MIII nil 
a new trial on 'the foregoing basis makes the other grounds set forth in Defendants' Motion for 
New Trial and the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict moot. 
l! is fiiiiiirliiH ORDERED, based Ill • ("onirfs Onln Grantinp " 
Judgment herein dated and entered Au.uus' • • . he ;tnd r< <mv - (eh\ vacated. 
It Is fil  i i: tl: s i i: OR D r
 i 
on or about October 3, ^-„ ., DO and iljie sam^ i„ ; 4 uvi ; .. 
DATED this 7_ ' day of ©etebftr, 1994. 
BY THE COUM : 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
i % 
Keith W. Meade 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
C:\WP5UHORRELLU01227H.OR 2 
J i. A ',• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the £p-z_ ^ay °f Oct°ber, 1994, in accordance with Rule 4-504(2) of 
i . ition, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
proposed ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL, VACATING JUDGMENT AND RELEASI* 
SIJI'HRNHDI'AS BOND In lie uidilul V\A IIISI cl.iss III.III, posLigc piqiaul, In 11 ic. lollmui , 
Keith W. N.™: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
C:\WP51\HORRELL\101227H.OR 3 
ADDENDUM E 
(Rule 61, U.R.C.P.) 
Rule ' Harmless
 e r r Q i 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, ant, .,., v^™ 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties,.. 
ADDENDUM F 
(Jury Instructions) 
»LED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 4 1994 
UNTYJ 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY S. HORRELL and 
BARBARA HORRELL, 
Plaintiffs , 
vs . 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and FARM BUREAU 
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant s 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CIVIL NO. 920903327 
(See Instructions No. 1 to No. H3 ) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2.5" 
If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the claim, 
its refusal to negotiate or settle may not constitute a breach of 
its duty. 
An insurer may be reasonably justified in denying a claim if 
the supporting law or facts are "fairly debatable" and would lead 
a reasonable insurance company in similar circumstances to deny the 
claim. "Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which 
support the insurer's position create a reasonable likelihood that 
the denial of the claim would be upheld in court. In determining 
whether or not the insurer's position was fairly debatable and 
reasonably justified, you should consider all laws or facts upon 
which a reasonable insurance company would rely in deciding whether 
to pay a claim. This would include the laws or facts supporting 
the insured's position that were either known, or that should have 
been known, by the insurer. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the \( day of July, 1995, to the 
following: 
Steven G. Morgan, Esq. 
Cynthia C. Meyer, Esq. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(lj/horrell.brf) 
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